The new taxing right established through Amount A of Pillar One[1] only applies to those multinational entity (MNE) groups that fall within the defined scope of Amount A.  The scope of Amount A is based on two elements:  an activity test and a threshold test.

According to the OECD, the definition of the scope responds to the need to revisit taxing rules in response to a changed economy.  The existing international tax rules generally attach a taxing right to profits derived from a physical presence in a jurisdiction.  However, given globalization and the digitalization of the economy, the OECD believes that businesses can, with or without the benefit of local operations, participate in an active and sustained manner in the economic life of a market jurisdiction through engagement extending beyond the mere conclusion of sales, in order to increase the value of their products, their sales and their profits.

Continue Reading Tax Challenges Arising From Digitalisation, Report on the OECD’S Pillar One Blueprint: Scope of Amount A

In February 2020, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”) released Transfer Pricing Guidance on Financial Transactions (“Guidance”). The Guidance is significant because it is the first time that the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines have been updated to include guidance on the transfer pricing aspects of financial transactions. The OECD expects that the Guidance should contribute to consistency in the application of transfer pricing and help to avoid transfer pricing disputes and double taxation. The Guidance addresses specific issues related to the pricing of financial transactions, such as treasury functions, intra-group loans, cash pooling, hedging, and guarantees. Those issues are the subject of separate posts. This post covers captive insurance.

The term “captive insurance” is intended to refer to an insurance undertaking or entity substantially all of whose insurance business is to provide insurance policies for risks of entities of the MNE group to which it belongs. The term “reinsurance” refers to a reinsurance undertaking or entity the purpose of which is to provide reinsurance policies for risks of unrelated parties that are in the first instance insured by entities of the MNE group to which it belongs.

Captive Insurers may be self-managed from within the MNE group, or managed by an unrelated service provider (often a division of a large insurance broker). Typically this management would include ensuring compliance with local law, issuing policy documents, collecting premiums, paying claims, preparing reports and providing local directors. If the captive insurance is managed from within the MNE group it is necessary to determine which entity manages it and to appropriately reward that management.

In order to consider the transfer pricing implications of a transaction with a captive insurer, the initial question will be whether the transaction under consideration is one of insurance. This analysis requires consideration of whether the risk has been assumed by the insurer and whether risk diversification has been achieved. Where the captive insurer insures the risk and reinsures it in the open market, it should receive an appropriate reward for the basic services it provides.

With respect to pricing of premiums, comparable uncontrolled prices may be available from comparable arrangements between unrelated parties. These may be internal comparables if the captive insurer has suitably similar business with unrelated customers, or there may be external comparables. Alternatively, actuarial analysis may be an appropriate method to independently determine the premium likely to be required at arm’s length for insurance of a particular risk. The remuneration of the captive insurer can also be arrived at by considering the arm’s length profitability of the captive insurer by reference to a two-staged approach, which takes into account both profitability of claims (the “combined ratio”) and return on capital.

Continue Reading OECD Guidance on Financial Transactions: Captive Insurance

Just in time for the holidays, the OECD has published detailed guidance about the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on transfer pricing. The guidance has useful information for taxpayers and tax administrations alike. It contains general advice on the application of basic transfer pricing principles during the pandemic, as well as specific advice on four issues: (i) comparability analyses, (ii) allocating losses, (iii) government-assistance programs, and (iv) advance pricing arrangements (“APAs”). The OECD guidance is broadly consistent with comments we made in a prior post about the impact of the pandemic on transfer pricing.

Continue Reading OECD Guidance on Pandemic’s Impact on Transfer Pricing

As indicated in an earlier post, the EU Commission had proposed in July to amend the Directive on Administrative Cooperation, to extend the EU tax transparency rules to digital platforms. The Member States have now agreed on the proposal. The agreed proposal on administrative cooperation (DAC 7) will ensure that Member States automatically exchange information on the revenues generated by sellers on digital platforms, whether the platform is located in the EU or not.

Continue Reading New Tax Transparency Rules for Digital Platforms (Update) and More

Prior to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 (“TCJA”), the appeal of cost sharing was driven largely by the deferral of U.S. taxation on foreign earnings. Now that excess foreign returns are currently taxable as “global intangible low-taxed income” (“GILTI”), cost sharing is attractive mostly to corporate taxpayers that have decided to continue holding their intangible property (“IP”) offshore and face GILTI tax, rather than bring the foreign-based IP back to the U.S. and enjoy the benefits of “foreign-derived intangible income.” The cost sharing decision is further affected by TCJA’s changes to Code Secs. 367, 482 and 936(h)(3)(B), which enhance the government’s ability to increase the taxable amount of outbound transfers made in taxable years beginning after December 31, 2017.

This article explores the impact of the TCJA on the issues typically arising in a common fact pattern targeted by the Internal Revenue Service.

Click here for the complete article.

In transfer pricing analysis, the determination of the entity or entities within a multinational enterprise that are entitled to share in the returns derived by the group from exploiting intangibles is crucial. A related issue is which entity or entities within the group should bear the costs, investments and other burdens associated with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development has addressed this topic as part of its 2017 Transfer Pricing Guidelines, and that guidance is the subject of this post. Although the legal owner of an intangible may initially receive the proceeds from exploitation of the intangible, other members of the legal owner’s group may have performed functions, used assets, or assumed risks that are expected to contribute to the value of the intangible. Members of the group performing such functions, using such assets and assuming such risks must be compensated for their contributions under the arm’s length principle.

Legal rights and contractual arrangements form the starting point for any transfer pricing analysis of transactions involving intangibles. The terms of a transaction may be found in written contracts, public records such as patent or trademark registrations, or in other communications between the parties. In identifying the legal owner of intangibles, an intangible and any license relating to that intangible are considered to be different intangibles for transfer pricing purposes, each having a different owner. While determining legal ownership and contractual arrangements is an important first step in the analysis, these determinations are separate from the question of remuneration under the arm’s length principle. For transfer pricing purposes, legal ownership of intangibles, by itself, does not necessarily confer any right ultimately to retain returns derived by the group from exploiting the intangible. Identification of legal ownership, combined with the identification and compensation of relevant functions performed, assets used, and risks assumed by all contributing members, provides the analytical framework for identifying arm’s length prices and other conditions for transactions involving intangibles.

The arm’s length principle requires that all members of the group receive appropriate compensation for any functions they perform, assets they use, and risks they assume in connection with the development, enhancement, maintenance, protection and exploitation of intangibles. An important question is how to determine the appropriate arm’s length remuneration to members of a group for their functions, assets and risks within the framework established by the taxpayer’s contractual arrangements, the legal ownership of intangibles, and the conduct of the parties. The determination of arm’s length compensation for functional contributions should consider the availability of comparable uncontrolled transactions, the importance of the functions performed to the creation of the intangible value, and the realistically available options of the parties. In assessing whether the compensation provided in the controlled transaction is consistent with the arm’s length principle, reference should be made to the level and nature of activity of comparable uncontrolled entities performing similar functions, the compensation received by comparable uncontrolled entities and the anticipated creation of intangible value by comparable uncontrolled entities.

Continue Reading DEMPE Functions

The parties recently completed briefing on an IRS motion for partial summary judgment in Western Digital Corporation v. Commissioner. The motion asks the US Tax Court to hold that a safe harbor in the Section 482 regulations is not relevant to whether intercompany receivable terms are “ordinary and necessary” under a provision in Subpart F. In our view, the motion is an unusual attempt to bar the taxpayer from making a well-founded legal argument in a case that is over a year away from trial.

Continue Reading IRS Seeks to Bar Transfer Pricing Argument in Western Digital

The European Union passed a sixth version of its Directive on Administrative Cooperation in the Field of Taxation, known as “DAC 6” (Directive (EU) 2018/82 2), on 25 May 2018. DAC 6 introduces reporting requirements for professional intermediaries (and under certain circumstances tax payers) relating to their involvement in a wide range of cross-border arrangements and transactions featuring “hallmarks” of tax planning concerning one or more EU Member States or the UK. These are referred to in DAC 6 as “reportable cross-border arrangements“. Specific hallmarks relate to transfer pricing (category E) and they do apply without main benefit test.

Failure to comply with DAC 6 could imply significant penalties under domestic legislations of the EU member states (and the UK) as well as reputational risks for not only intermediaries ( law firms, accounting firms , banks …) but also for businesses and individuals.

Continue Reading Always More Transparency in the EU: DAC6 and Transfer Pricing

Addressing the tax challenges arising from the digitalization of the economy has been a top priority of the OECD since 2015.  In January 2019, the OECD agreed to examine proposals in two pillars.  Pillar One is focused on nexus and profit allocation whereas Pillar Two is focused on global minimum tax.  In July 2020 the OECD was mandated to produce reports on the Blueprints of Pillar One and Pillar Two by October 2020.

According to the OECD, in an increasingly digital age, businesses are able to generate profits through participation in the economic life of a jurisdiction with or without the benefit of a local physical presence, and this should be reflected in the design of nexus rules.  The Pillar One Blueprint proposes to allocate a portion of residual profit of in-scope businesses to market or user jurisdictions (“Amount A”) generally without regard to physical presence. Continue Reading Tax Challenges Arising from Digitalisation, Report on the OECD’s Pillar One Blueprint: Executive Summary

Last week, the IRS issued new guidance that addresses “telescoping” in mutual agreement procedure (“MAP”) and advance pricing agreement (“APA”) cases. Very generally, the guidance disallows (subject to a $10 million materiality exception) telescoping for tax years starting in 2018, when the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (“TCJA”) came into effect, while continuing to allow telescoping for pre-2018 years in appropriate cases. According to the IRS’s Advance Pricing and Mutual Agreement (“APMA”) program, the new guidance was needed to address the impact of the TCJA “and its many interlocking provisions that require careful determination (and redetermination, as needed) of a U.S. taxpayer’s taxable income and tax attributes.” The new guidance has the potential to drive up compliance costs by increasing the number of tax returns that taxpayers must file to resolve MAP and APA resolutions for post-TCJA years (and resolutions spanning both pre- and post-TCJA years).

Continue Reading Telescoping into the Void